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拋出這個(gè)問題就好像問“史泰龍和施瓦辛格哪個(gè)更具女性魅力”一樣，我們可以比較兩人的二頭肌和個(gè)人魅力，但話說回來，俄羅斯和中國(guó)本質(zhì)上都不是民主國(guó)家。中國(guó)人和俄羅斯人也許過上了前所未有的好日子，但這兩個(gè)國(guó)家都不符合民主的基本定義——開放性的選舉。
不過，兩國(guó)免不了要遭遇民主化、全球化的大潮。過去，非民主國(guó)家可以依靠君主威望或意識(shí)形態(tài)來支撐；如今，治理國(guó)家的權(quán)力唯一來源是人民主權(quán)。霸道不再是俄羅斯或中國(guó)的行事邏輯。民主化的必然結(jié)果人民賦權(quán)，尤其是在這全球化時(shí)代，技術(shù)和通訊進(jìn)步助力頗多。非民主國(guó)家仍然阻止不了民眾使用互聯(lián)網(wǎng)與外界保持聯(lián)系。
金融危機(jī)也是一個(gè)不容忽視的因素。危機(jī)爆發(fā)伊始，許多分析家認(rèn)為這將破壞新興民主體的穩(wěn)定局勢(shì)，還有人斷言，此次危機(jī)向威權(quán)主義政府宣判了死刑。但實(shí)際情況要復(fù)雜得多：民主主義與威權(quán)主義的界限變得模糊。俄羅斯與中國(guó)的體制雖然還不能說提供了一條替代性道路，但至少已經(jīng)調(diào)整、適應(yīng)了民主化大潮的挑戰(zhàn)。寬泛地說，俄羅斯人假裝民主，中國(guó)人假裝共產(chǎn)主義。
俄羅斯和中國(guó)，哪個(gè)更民主？（資料圖）
兩種詭辯
1989-1991年間，蘇聯(lián)和中國(guó)的共產(chǎn)主義領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層意識(shí)到，共產(chǎn)主義的體制已經(jīng)無法有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。但兩國(guó)對(duì)失靈的肇因有著不同理解。蘇聯(lián)的戈?duì)柊蛦谭蛘J(rèn)為，社會(huì)主義理念有它的價(jià)值，壞的是共產(chǎn)黨，蘇共已經(jīng)失去了社會(huì)動(dòng)員的能力。戈?duì)柊蛦谭虻纳鐣?huì)轉(zhuǎn)型理念是超越政黨統(tǒng)治，發(fā)展西方模式下的有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的國(guó)家體制。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的想法迥然不同。后者認(rèn)為，共產(chǎn)主義、社會(huì)主義的理念（尤其在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)意義上）出了問題，值得保留的是共產(chǎn)黨本身，及其管理社會(huì)的能力。所以，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨人全力以赴，確�；镜臋�(quán)力機(jī)制不受破壞。
這兩個(gè)國(guó)家現(xiàn)在如何？俄羅斯政府乍看之下當(dāng)然很像民主政體。俄羅斯有民主憲法、有選舉、有多黨制，還有一些自由媒體。假如外星人突然降臨俄羅斯，他會(huì)覺得這個(gè)國(guó)家就是民主的。相反，中國(guó)看起來不民主，更像是一個(gè)典型的共產(chǎn)主義政權(quán)。馬利德（Richard McGregor）在《中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨不可說的秘密》（The Party）一書中寫道：“北京繼承了二十世紀(jì)共產(chǎn)政權(quán)的大量特質(zhì)。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨消滅了政治敵人，解除了司法獨(dú)立和媒體獨(dú)立，限制了宗教和公民社會(huì)，建立了全面的公安網(wǎng)絡(luò)，還把異見者送入勞改營(yíng)”。
自1989年以來，中國(guó)的體制設(shè)計(jì)沒什么大變化，但俄羅斯卻天翻地覆。悖論卻是，俄羅斯試圖模仿西方民主體制，結(jié)果卻喪失了政治能動(dòng)力，決策能力低下。人們普遍認(rèn)為，中國(guó)政府在決策能力上比俄羅斯更為高效。中國(guó)大概比俄羅斯更民主。中國(guó)政府更善于自我糾正。中國(guó)人成功地吸納了民主制度的關(guān)鍵元素，同時(shí)，保留共產(chǎn)主義政權(quán)的基本權(quán)力制度。
五點(diǎn)理由：中國(guó)比俄羅斯更民主
權(quán)力更替
俄羅斯當(dāng)然有選舉，但那不是權(quán)力更替。蘇共垮臺(tái)后的二十年間，現(xiàn)任總統(tǒng)從未在選舉中失手過。選舉不是為了更替權(quán)力，而是維持權(quán)力。在中國(guó)，反對(duì)派也沒有勝選的機(jī)會(huì)。但另一方面，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人掌握最高權(quán)力不會(huì)超過10年，黨的總書記和國(guó)家主席職位會(huì)自動(dòng)進(jìn)行新的選舉。換言之，俄羅斯的選舉是為了掩飾權(quán)力更替的缺失，而中國(guó)則是發(fā)展了具有權(quán)力更替特征的體制。當(dāng)然，我們還是在討論兩個(gè)非競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性政權(quán)。但中國(guó)人知道，你必須更換領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層，否則就會(huì)出問題。中國(guó)體制基于集體領(lǐng)導(dǎo)原則，防止了個(gè)人化的威權(quán)主義，具有更強(qiáng)的分權(quán)制衡因素。中國(guó)不同于俄羅斯，沒有權(quán)力交接的困擾：中共具備明晰的權(quán)力交接程序。
傾聽民意
按照定義，非民主政權(quán)本質(zhì)上無法順暢地響應(yīng)民意。監(jiān)聽和民意調(diào)查無法代替定期的、自由的、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性選舉所體現(xiàn)的民意。民主選舉不僅是選領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，也是測(cè)量民眾立場(chǎng)的直接手段。
但在“傾聽民意”方面，中俄有著巨大差異。必須提到的一點(diǎn)是，中國(guó)政府沒有在法律上禁止工人抗議。勞資沖突通常都是指向地方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)或公司老板，對(duì)于黨本身沒有危險(xiǎn)。所以，每年都有數(shù)以萬計(jì)的罷工，并且這已成為可靠的信息來源。直接的抗議要比民意調(diào)查更有價(jià)值，更能考驗(yàn)地方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)處理危機(jī)的能力。在俄羅斯，理論上體制更加民主，但你看不到罷工，因?yàn)榱T工代價(jià)極為高昂。俄羅斯的賄選現(xiàn)象削弱了民意表達(dá)的有效性以及地方官員的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力。
寬容異見
民主的決策過程需要多元的意見和寬容的心態(tài)。比較中俄兩國(guó)，俄羅斯對(duì)于反對(duì)派組織更為寬容。過程很糟糕，但你至少可以注冊(cè)一個(gè)政黨，甚至上街抗議要求普京下臺(tái)。中國(guó)政府在這方面更為嚴(yán)厲。克里姆林宮對(duì)反對(duì)派持寬容態(tài)度，但對(duì)他們的意見充耳不聞。政府不允許異見者干預(yù)政策，官員也會(huì)小心翼翼地避免與反對(duì)派站在同一立場(chǎng)上。
中國(guó)的體制更加威權(quán)主義和共產(chǎn)主義，決策的質(zhì)量更高、更具包容性。在俄羅斯，就算你和精英們意見不同，大多數(shù)只會(huì)覺得這是“屁股決定腦袋”。而在中國(guó)的集體領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制度下，意見不同則是正�，F(xiàn)象。只有到了真正的執(zhí)行階段，黨才要求忠誠(chéng)。在俄羅斯，總統(tǒng)一提出想法，“忠誠(chéng)測(cè)驗(yàn)”就開始了。普遍的樂觀精神和國(guó)力上升，也使得中國(guó)人對(duì)于政策走向的異議持更加寬容的態(tài)度。
吸納精英
也許，中俄兩國(guó)政治制度最有趣的差異是吸納精英的方式。政府要職由哪些人來填補(bǔ)？新聞周刊《Russkiy Reporter》2011年末發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些有趣的事實(shí)。第一，絕大多數(shù)俄羅斯精英都來自兩所大學(xué)。第二，300個(gè)最高層的政府官員中，沒有一個(gè)來自遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)。第三，精英圈子在普京當(dāng)上總統(tǒng)以前就對(duì)他十分熟悉。簡(jiǎn)而言之，俄羅斯是由一小幫子人統(tǒng)治的。這和選賢任能毫無關(guān)系：其中大多人都沒有匹配的資歷，但最終總能占據(jù)統(tǒng)治精英的一席之地。
這不是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的運(yùn)作方式。中共盡可能擴(kuò)大社會(huì)精英的階層范圍，選拔最為優(yōu)秀的人才。如果你足夠睿智、如果你想飛黃騰達(dá)，中共會(huì)張開雙臂歡迎你。中共成為吸納精英、讓精英服務(wù)社會(huì)的工具，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層投入大量精力，努力保證精英的地區(qū)代表性，讓干部在各個(gè)地方獲取經(jīng)驗(yàn)。
試驗(yàn)精神
最后一點(diǎn)，中俄看待政治的試驗(yàn)性方式完全不同。中國(guó)的政治改革和經(jīng)濟(jì)改革圍繞著不同地區(qū)、不同模式的試驗(yàn)，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層從中考量何種模式更為有效。俄羅斯的情形完全不同，基本上，“試驗(yàn)”在那兒是句臟話。他們筑建國(guó)家的過程中從不試驗(yàn)。
有何意義？
總之，從前你可以通過制度衡量民主程度，現(xiàn)在你必須要問制度是如何運(yùn)作的。在多大程度上像民主？可能是假民主嗎？俄羅斯是一個(gè)極好的例子。俄羅斯搭建了民主的表面功夫，但表面之下，各種非民主因素暗潮洶涌。中國(guó)完全是另一個(gè)國(guó)家，威權(quán)主義、管制嚴(yán)厲。但由于體制壓力、轉(zhuǎn)型期各種思潮以及對(duì)外開放，中國(guó)的政治實(shí)踐比表面上要開放得多。
自我糾錯(cuò)和問責(zé)制度是民主的根本優(yōu)勢(shì)�？死锬妨謱m里面有許多人以為，過度民主化是新興國(guó)家問題的根源。許多人羨慕中國(guó)“貨真價(jià)實(shí)的”威權(quán)主義。但事實(shí)是，中國(guó)在許多方面比俄羅斯更加民主，決策機(jī)制更加優(yōu)越。過去二十年間，中國(guó)致力于提高國(guó)家能力，俄羅斯看起來則專注于掩蓋無能。西方評(píng)論家考量新興威權(quán)主義國(guó)家之間的差異時(shí)，思路應(yīng)該超越形式上的制度設(shè)計(jì)。
Is China more democratic than Russia?
Ivan Krastev
Asking the question, 'who is more democratic, Russia or China'? is in some ways like asking the question 'who is more feminine, Sylvester Stallone or Arnold Schwarzenegger'? We can spend some time comparing bicep sizes, and we can speculate about their gentle souls, but Russia and China are essentially two non-democracies. The average Chinese or Russian may today be wealthier and freer than any time before, but neither country can satisfy a minimalist definition of democracy, i.e. competitive elections with uncertain outcomes.
The broader trends of democratization and globalization have not, however, passed either by. If in the past, monarchical power or ideology gave strong foundations to non-democratic regimes, today the only way to claim the right to govern is to claim popular backing. Coercion is no longer the central survival logic of either the Russian and Chinese regimes. A corollary of democratization is the empowerment of people, and in particular the role of technology and communication within a globalizing society. However hard they may try, non-democratic countries are still unable to prevent people from using the Internet, keeping cross-border connections, travelling or obtaining information about the wider world.
Added to these trends is another factor: financial crisis. At the onset of the difficulties, many analysts assumed that the effects would destabilize emerging democracies; others saw the crisis as a death sentence for authoritarian regimes. What seems to have happened is instead something more complex: a blurring of the border between democracy and authoritarianism. Though not quite representing an alternative to the age of democratization, the Russian and Chinese systems have essentially become adjustments to it. Broadly speaking, the Russians are faking democracy while the Chinese are faking communism.
A tale of two sophistries
At the juncture 1989-1991, both communist leaderships – Soviet and Chinese – came to realize that Communism had become a dysfunctional type of system. But they had different understandings of what was wrong with it. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev decided that what was worth preserving were the socialist ideas, and what was bad was the Communist Party and its inability to bring to mobilize the energy of the society. His idea of social transformation meant moving beyond Party rule, and developing a state which could be competitive in the Western paradigm. The Chinese Communist Party took a totally different view. They believed what was bad about communism were the communist, socialist ideas, especially in an economic sense, and what was good about socialism was the Communist Party itself and its capacity to keep control of society. So they did everything to keep the power infrastructure intact.
What do these regimes look like today? The Russian regime, observed from afar, certainly looks like a democracy. It enjoys a democratic constitution, runs elections, has a multiparty political system, has some free media and has not yet used tanks to crush massive public protests. If an alien with a degree in political science came from some other planet and landed in Russia, he would most probably think the country was a democracy. China, on the other hand, does not look like a democracy, not even to our alien friend. It is, instead, rather like a classic communist regime. As Richard McGregor observes in his book 'The Party': 'Beijing retains a surprising number of qualities that characterized communist regimes of the twentieth century. The Party in China has eradicated and emasculated political rivals, eliminated the autonomy of courts and press, restricted religion and civil society, established extensive network of security police, and dispatched dissidents to labour camps'.
On the level of institutional design not so much has changed in China since 1989, but almost everything has changed in Russia. The paradox, though, is that Russia's imitation of democratic institutions has led to the establishment of an ineffective political regime deprived of political dynamism and characterized by low quality decision-making. The Chinese regime is generally accepted to be much more effective than the Russian one, and the quality of its decision-making is certainly much better. Moreover, it is arguably more democratic than Russia. Chinese regimes are much more capable of self-correction. They have succeeded in integrating key democratic elements while preserving the communist infrastructure of power.
Five reasons why China is more democratic than Russia
Power Rotation
Russia clearly has elections, but no rotation of power. In the two post-communist decades, the president has not lost a single election: the role of the elections are not to secure the rotation of power, but to avoid it. In the case of China, clearly, the opposition doesn't have a chance of winning either. Yet on the other hand, Chinese leaders do not stay in power for any more than ten years, after which a new party leader and president are automatically elected. In other words, in the Russian system elections are used as the way to legitimize the lack of rotation, while the Chinese Communist institutional structure has developed to allow an element of power rotation. Of course, we are still talking about two non-competitive regimes. But the Chinese understand that you need to change leadership, or you have a problem. The Chinese system, based on the principle of collective leadership, prevents the emergence of personalized authoritarianism and provides much more checks and balances. Unlike Russia, China is not haunted by the ghost of succession: the Party ensures a clear process of succession.
Listening to the people
By definition, non-democratic regimes have in-built hearing problems. Surveillance and polling can never replace the information that comes from people regularly taking place in free and competitive elections. Democratic elections are not only an option to elect leaders, but also a direct way to gauge where people stand.
When it comes to 'hearing the people', however, there is an important difference between China and Russia. This comes down to the fact that the Chinese government has not criminalized labour protest. Labour conflicts, ordinarily directed against regional leaders or company directors, are not considered dangerous for the Party. So every year there are hundreds of thousands of strikes, and these have become an important source of reliable information. When people participate in a direct protest, it is much better than pure polls – valuable not only because they are visible, but because they also offer an opportunity to contest the ability of the local leaders to settle conflicts. In Russia, the supposedly more democratic system, you don't see strikes, because the price for protesting on labour issues is very high. Russia's rigged elections are a much weaker test to judge the mood of the people and the ability of the regional leaders to deal with them.
Tolerance of opposition, tolerance of dissent
Democratic decision making depends upon both a diversity of views and the acceptability of disagreement, and here is where we uncover another point of divergence. If you compare Russia and China, you will see that in Russia there is certainly much more tolerance for organized opposition. The process is completely screwed up, but you can register a party, you can go on the street to protest, you can even ask Putin to resign. The Chinese regime is certainly much harsher and intolerant in this respect. But while the Kremlin broadly tolerates the opposition, it does not listen to it. It does not allow for dissent on policy matters and government officials are careful not to advocate policies favoured by the opposition.
Though the Chinese system is much more classically authoritarian and communist, its decision-making process is of a much better quality, more inclusive than the Russian one. In Russia, even when you have differences within the elite, most people explain them simply on the basis of economic differences. In the case of Chinese collective leadership, having different views is actually seen as legitimate. The loyalty test in China starts only once the Communist Party has taken a decision. The loyalty test in Russia starts as soon as the president makes a proposal. A sense of general optimism and rising power also seems to have made China more tolerable to dissent on policy positions.
Recruitment of elites
Perhaps the most interesting comparison you can make between the two political systems is the way each country goes about recruiting its elites. Where do people come from to occupy the most important positions in the state and leading industry? A study conducted by Russkiy Reporter in the end of 2011 revealed a number of interesting facts on this front. First, the great majority of the Russian elites went to one of just two universities. Second, none of those occupying the top 300 positions came from the Russian Far East. And, third, the most important factor influencing membership of this elite circle is to have known Mr Putin before he became president. In short, Russia is governed by a circle of friends. This is not a meritocratic system in any sense: most of these people have not had proper careers, but have simply ended in this ruling group.
This is not the way in which the Chinese Communist Party works. It is doing its best to create different layers of society, and does try to make the system reasonably meritocratic. If you are cynical enough, if you want to do well, if you want to make money, the Communist Party is open for you. The Communist Party serves as a vehicle to recruit and socialize elites, and the Chinese leadership invests a lot in ensuring regional representation and providing its cadres with opportunity to get diverse experience.
Experimentation
My last point comparing these two systems is to emphasize the way in which the Chinese and Russians totally differ in their view of the experimental nature of politics. Chinese political and economic reforms are organized around experimentation with different models in the different regions aimed at figuring out what works from the point of view of the leadership. This is emphatically not the case in Russia, where experiment is, basically, a dirty word. They are not experimenting in the process of trying to build a governable state.
What does it all mean?
In summary, while there was once a time that you measured democracy looking at institutions, now you need to also ask questions about how the institutions function. Do they look like democracies? Is it possible that the democracy is faked? Russia is a brilliant example that should force us to think. It has fashioned a democratic surface, but under this surface all types of non-democratic practices are flourishing. China is another country – authoritarian and severe undoubtedly. But because of the pressure of the system, the different ideas underlying its transformation, and the country's involvement on the world stage, its political practices are much more open than its formal institutions may lead us to believe.
It is the capacity of a given political regime for self-correction and public accountability that it is at the heart of any democratic advantage. There are now many in the Kremlin who, on the contrary, think that excessive democratization has been responsible for many of the problems that the new country faces. Many envy 'true' Chinese authoritarianism. But the truth is that in many of its practices China is more democratic than Russia, and its decision-making is undoubtedly superior. Over the last two decades, when China was busy with capacity building, Russia seems to have been preoccupied with incapacity hiding. When western commentators try to make sense of the different performance of the new authoritarians, they would be well advised to look beyond formal institutional design.
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